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PARTIES AND ISSUES PRESENTED
The

persons

or

associations

whose

interests

may

be

substantially affected by this petition include the Plaintiff,
Cindy Deats, the Defendant, Commercial Security Bank, and other
similarly

situated

negligence

plaintiffs possessing

and more particularly

causes of action in

in the area of

slip-and-fall

injuries to business invitees.
The issue presented in this petition is whether the trial
court's

instruction,

and

the

Court

of

Appeals 1

subsequent

affirmation of the instruction that a plaintiff is required to
avoid a hazard, or is negligent, constituted a prejudicial error
which mislead the jury and thereby resulted in a verdict contrary
to the evidence,

OPINION OF COURT OF APPEALS
The Court of Appeals rendered its decision in this case in
its opinion: Deats v. Commercial Security Bank, 72 Utah Adv. Rep.
58 (Ct. App., Dec. 15, 1987).

JURISDICTION
On December 15, 1987, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the
jury's verdict

and held that the trial court properly

denied

plaintiff's motion for new trial.
The Supreme Court of Utah is vested with jurisdiction over
this petition pursuant to Sections 78-2-2 and 78-2a-4, Utah Code

Annotated (1953, as amended), and Rules 19 and 42 of the Rules of
the Utah Supreme Court.

CONTROLLING STATUTES
Sections

78-27-37, 38 Utah Code Ann.

(1953, as amended)

enacted 1973; amended 1986.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The

Plaintiff/Petitioner

initiated

this

action

against

Commercial Security Bank to recover for injuries received as the
result of a slip-and-fall at a parking terrace owned and operated
by

Commercial

Security

Bank

in February

of

1984.

The

jury

returned a verdict of no cause of action, finding that the bank
was not negligent.

The Petitioner subsequently filed a motion

for a new trial, alleging, among other things, that the evidence
was

insufficient

to justify

the verdict, and that the Court

committed prejudicial error by instructing the jury that the
Plaintiff was required to avoid the icy condition of the parking
lot.
Instruction No. 25 read:
"Ordinarily, a plaintiff in any action has a duty of
seeing and avoiding, if reasonable, a hazard which is
plainly visible, and if the plaintiff unreasonably
failed to so do, then the plaintiff is negligent either
in failing to look, or in failing to heed what he or
she saw."
The Petitioner strenuously objected to the use of the instruction
on the grounds that it misstated the Plaintiff's required duty of

-2-

care, and confused the jury, since it implies that if the
Plaintiff was negligent, she could not recover.

JUSTIFICATION FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT
A writ of certiorari should issue in this matter since the
decision

of

the

Court

of

Appeals

conflicts

with

several

principles of law pronounced by the Supreme Court in the cases of
Moore v. Burton Lumber & Hardware Co., 631 P.2d 865 (Utah, 1981);
Jacobsen Constr. Co. Inc. v. Structo-Lite Engineering, Inc., 619
P. 2d 306 (Utah, 1980); and Stephens v. Henderson, 63 Utah Adv.
Rep.

10

(Utah, August

13, 1987).

All

three

cases

seem

to

indicate that a jury should be focused on whether a reasonably
prudent person in the exercise of due care would have incurred
the risk, despite a knowledge of it, and if so, whether the
Plaintiff's unreasonableness
less than the Defendant's.

or negligence would be viewed as
See Jacobsen at 312; Moore at 870;

and Stephens at 63 Utah Adv. Rep. at 11 and 12.

Based on this

Court's holdings in Jacobsen, Moore, and Stephens,, the assumption
of risk language of Instruction No. 25 is not appropriate under
our comparative negligence statutes since such language implies
that if the plaintiff was at all negligent, she cannot recover.
The language of Instruction No. 25 is derived from two Utah
Supreme

Court

cases

that

were

decided

under

contributory

negligence standards which were a complete bar to a plaintiff's
recovery.

See Whitman v. W. T. Grant Co.,

16 Utah 2d 81, 395

P.2d 918 (1964); Richards v. Anderson, 9 Utah 2d 17, 337 P.2d 59
(1959).

Given the statutory change to comparative negligence and

-3-

given the fact that this court has ruled that assumption of risk
language is not appropriate under our comparative negligence
statutes, the Court of Appeals' ruling that Instruction No. 25 is
a proper statement of the law clearly creates a conflict in the
decisions

of the

Supreme

Court

and

creates

confusion

in an

important area of law defining a plaintiff's duty of care in
negligence actions.
For these reasons, petitioner respectfully requests that a
Writ of Certiorari issue for further review by the Supreme Court.
SUBMITTED THIS

/3

day of January

&*

: ROBERT A. ECimRD
ATTORNEY FOR/ THE PETITIONER/
PLAIMTFF
vj

-4-
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Code* Co
Pro*o Utah

pleading only by leave of court or
Citeas
by ^written consent of the -adverse
I
72 Utah Adv. Rep. 53
party; and leave shall be freely
given when justice so requires.
IN THE
In considering a motion to amend, the trial
UTAH
COURT
OF APPEALS
judge must decide 'whether the opposing side
would^ be put to 'unavoidable prejudice by
having" an issue adjudicated for which he had Cindy DEATS,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
not time to prepare/ Beklns Bar V Ranch v.
y.
Huth, 664 P.2d 4551 464 (Utah'1983). Absent
a clear abuse of discretion, this Court will not COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK,
Defendant and Respondent.
disturb a trial court's ruling on a motion to
amend. Guard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245 Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and
(Utah 1983).
,
Bench.
^ Mrs. Kelly -'argues the amendment would
result in so prejudice to Babcock and Brown No. 860322-CA
because they were aware of her action for J FILED: December 15,1987
more than two yean and participated in discovery by attending her deposition. Although SECOND DISTRICT
they attended plaintiff s deposition, Babcock Honorable David E. Roth
and Brown did not participate by asking their ATTORNEYS:
own questions. Mere awareness of an action
Robert A. Echard for Appellant.
against other parties does not require a defendant to prepare a defense m anticipation of Donald J. Purser, J. Angus Edwards for
Respondent.
plaintiff s decision at some future tune to jom
defendant as a party. See Randall v. Saivanon
OPINION
Army, 100 Nev. 466, 686 P.2d 241 (1984)
(consolidation does not necessarily render litBILLINGS, Judge:
igant! pamestaeach other's suits). .
Plaintiff Cindy Deats ('Deats*) appeals
^JTbercase had been pending for over three
years * when, just prior to trial, Mrs. Kelly from a jury verdict that Commercial Security
moved to amend her complaint. A hearing on Bank (*CSB*) was not negligent in the mainthe motion was held one week before trial was tenance of its parking terrace. Deats claims
set to begnu Babcock and Brown were prep- that the jury's verdict was contrary to the
ared N to defend against five personal injury evidence and manifestly unjust,, and that a
claims* That does not mean they could be J jury instruction misstated the law, constituting
required to defend, on short notice, a wron- prejudicial error. We affirm.
gful death action of a different plaintiff. If the
I.
toal court had gramed the motion so close to J
, trial* it may have required a continuance of
FACTS
the trial which, in turn, could have prejudiced
At 7:05 a.m. on Monday, February 27,
the consolidated casesfc - 7 , ^ ^ ^ ^
,. - \ 1984, Deats parked on the uncovered fourth
"X^We^conciude tic trial court acted within its | level of a parking structure owned by CSB.
- discretion injienymg Mrs J" Kelly's motion to I Arriving before sunnse, Deats was the first
amend. The "court's order h affirmed. jCosts patron of the parking lot. After parking her
c toBabcock and Brown. r< ^J ^ ^ ^ ^ r ** ^ " I car, Deats, while walkingA towards the exit
^sdRusseil WcBench* J u d g e s * „r -v*^
i^ stairway, decided to move her car because she
thougnt another car might slide mto it. While
* WE "CONCUR: ******&* ^ *U-~ v*m*i~tar returning to move her car to a safer location,*
Dears sfovped and feU on the ice, hurpng her
^ ^ a m e l a T f Greenw6odr ludgr " - S s s a " * s£ left knee. After she had moved her car, Deats'
observed a person throwing sand or salt on the
previously unsanded parking surface-"* Deats
fUed a negligence action against' CSB to*
recover for the personal injuries she sustained
from the fall.
- ^The case was submitted to the jury after the
tnai judge read thirty-nine Instrucuons^ihchiding instructions on comparative negligence*
the duty of care required of business mviton,
and the duty ot care required of a plainaff in
a negligence action.
' The jury found that CSB was not negligent.
Deats subsequently filed a motion for a new
tnal pursuant to Ru,e 59 of the Utah Rules of
For compete Utah Code AOHOUCIOIIS, onsuit Code •Co* s Annotation Service

App. i

Code* Co
PTOVQ,

72 UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS

Uuh

Civil Procedure, alleging: (1) the jury's verdict
was contrary to the evidence and manifestly
unjust, and (2) instruction twenty-five was a
misstatement of the law, constituting prejudicial error.
The trial court denied Deats* motion for a
new trial and this appeal ensued.

n.

59

by affidavits of two jurors, claiming they
misunderstood the trial court's instructions. It
is well-established, however, that Rule
59(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
allows an affidavit by a juror to impeach the
verdict only when the verdict was determined
by chance or bribery.' Rosenlaf v." Sullivan,
676 P.2d 373, 375 (Utah 1983). Her attempt to
impeach the verdict by way of affidavit is
plainly contrary to law. The jurors' misunderstanding of the court's instruction is not one
of the narrowly defined grounds available
under Rule 59(a)(2).

THE JURY'S VERDICT
A jury's verdict which is the subject of a
motion for a new trial will be reversed only if
the evidence supporting it was completely
lacking or so slight and unconvincing as to
m.
make the verdict plainly unreasonable and
unjust. Roylance v. Rowe, 111 P.2d 232, 234
INSTRUCTION TWENTY-FIVE
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). We review the jury's
Deats' second issue on appeal is that instrverdict in the light most favorable to the pre- uction twenty-five misstated the law regarvailing party, and accord the evidence prese- ding a plaintiffs duty of care, thereby causing
nted and every reasonable inference fairly the jury to erroneously find that CSB was not
drawn from the evidence the same degree of negligent. Deats contends instruction twentydeference. Anderson v. Toone, 671 P.2d 170, five constitutes an "assumption of risk* inst172 (Utah 1983); see Jacobsen Construction ruction, which is not permissible under Utah's
Co. v. Structo-Lite Engineering, Inc., 619 comparative negligence statutes. Utah Code
P.2d 306, 308 (Utah 1980).
I Ann. §§78-27-37, , -38 (1987). We disa* In determining whether a business invitor gree.
was negligent, the inquiry is whether the
Instruction twenty-five reads:
owner or its employees knew, or in the exerOrdinarily, a plaintiff in any
cise of ordinary care should have known, that
action
has the duty of seeing and
a dangerous condition existed, and whether
avoiding, if reasonable, a hazard
sufficient time elapsed such that corrective
which is plainly visible, and if the
action could have been taken to remedy the
plaintiff [unreasonably] failed to do
situation. Martin v. Safeway Stores Inc., 565
so, then the plaintiff is negligent
P.2d 1139, 1140-41 (Utah 1977). Property
either in failing to look or in failing
owners are not insurers for the safety of their
to heed what he or she saw.
business invitees. Id.
Deats urges us to interpret this instruction
Applying this legal principle, the evidence, as meaning that Deats is barred from recovery
viewed in a light favorable to the jury's / / she failed to avoid the icy conditions of the
verdict, adequately supports the verdict that parking surface, regardless of "whether she
CSB was not negligent in the operation and exercised reasonable care and regardless of
maintenance of its parking terrace. Testimony whether CSB exercised reasonable care. If this
revealed that CSB was servicing the fourth interpretation is correct, then Deats contends
level of the parking terrace at approximately the jury would net apportion the negligence
the time of Deats' early arrival. The jury between the paries. We reject Deats' constrcould have reasonably concluded that suffic- uction of this instruction.
ient time had not elapsed since the ice formed
Instructions are read in their entire context
such that CSB could have remedied the situand given meaning in accordance with the
ation.
ordinary and usuai import of the ianroage as
In finding that CSB was not at all negligent,
it would be understood by lay jurors. Brunson
the jury necessarily found that Deats was 100
v. Strong, 17 Utah 2d 364, 367, 412 F.2d 451,
percent negligent. The evidence, again viewed
452-53
(1966), Under Utah 9 ! comr-arative
in a light favorable to the jury's verdict,
negligence
statute, Utah Code Ann. 373-27supports the jury's determination that Deats
38
(1987),
•
and its a<xompanying definition
was 100 percent negligent. First, Deats admitted she knew the uncovered fourth Itvel of counterpart, Utah Code Ann. §78-27-37
the parking terrace was icy. Second, Deats (1S37), the concept of contributory nsgiigence
conceded she did not have to park on the includes what was formerly termed secondary
fourth level. Indeed, on a prior occasion, assumption of risk: "the unreasonable encouDeats parked on an adjacent street when she ntering of a known and appreciated risk/
knew the fourth level parking surface would Moore v. Burton Lumber & Hardware Co.,
be icy. Third, Deats arrived before sunrise. 631 P.2d 865, 870 (Utah 1981); see Jacobsen
Given the totality of the circumstances, we Constr. Co., 619 P.2d at 310, 312. More
specifically,
find the jury's verdict reasonable and just.
Deats attempts to impeach the jury's verdict
For complete Utah Code Annotations, consult Code«Co's Annotation Service
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tne reasona&ieness of plaintiffs
J
bonduct in confronting a known or
unknown risk created by defendant's negligence will basically be
determined under principles of
contributory negligence. Attention
should be focused on whether a
reasonably prudent man in the
exercise of due care would have
Incurred the risk,"despite his knol
wledge of it, and if so, whether he
would have conducted himself in
the manner in which, the plaintiff
acted in light of all the surrounding
circumstances, including the appreciated risk.
Jacobsen Constr. Co., 619 P.2d at 312.
It is well-settled that a plaintiff, acting in a
reasonanbly prudent manner, has a duty to
foresee a danger, Moore v. Burton Lumber &
Hardware Co., 631 P.2d at 870, particularly
one that is plainly visible, and avoid it. Hindmarsh v, O. P. Skaggs Foodliner, 21 Utah 2d
413, 416-17, 446 P.2d 410, 412 (1968). If a
plaintiff fails to see or sees but falls to avoid
the danger, then the plaintiff acted negligently.
See Pollesche v. K-Mart Enterprises of Utah,
Inc.r$20 P.2d 200, 203 (Utah 1974) (plaintiff
who sees and ignores the danger is guilty of
contributory negligence as a matter of law);
Hindmarsh, 21 Utah 2d 413 at 417, 446 P.2d
at 412; Whitman v. W, T. Grant Co., 16 Utah
2d Sh 83, 395 P.2d 918, 920 (1964) (plaintiff
can be negligent either in failing to look or in
failing to heed what he or she saw).
Instruction twenty-five, when read together
with all of the other instructions given on
negligence, is a correct statement of a plaintiffs duty in a negligence action. Nowhere in
instruction twenty-five, nor in any of the
other remaining thirty-eight instructions, did
the trial court intimate that if Deats was negligent then she was precluded from recovering.
On the contrary, the instructions, when read
in their entirety, adequately informed the jury
of CSB's duty of care as a property owner,
•Deats' duty of care, and most importantly, of
the procedure by which the jury must appor:tion negligence if both parties were found to
have acted negligently.
[
The -trial court properly denied Deats' [
.motion for a new trial. The evidence supper- 1
ting the Jury's findings was ample and conv- I
lincing, and the verdict, therefore, was not
unreasonable nor unjust. Roylance,. 737 P.2d
at 234; Nelson v. Ttufflo, 657 P.2d 730, 732
(Utah 1982).
Affirmed.^Costs to Commerical Security
Bank.)
Judith M. Billings, Judge
I

-

WE CONCUR:
Russell W. Bench, Judge
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
For complete Utah Code Annotations, consult Code*Co's Annotation Service

78-27-36

JUDICIAL CODE

indicates by any form of written expression the intention of the injured
person not to be bound by the settlement agreement, liability release, or
disavowed statement.
History: L. 1973, en. 208, § 4.

78-27-36. Right of rescission or disavowal of release, settlement, or
statement by injured person in addition to other provisions.—The rights
provided by this act are intended to be in addition to, and not in lieu of,
any rights of rescission, rules of evidence, or provisions otherwise existing
in the law.
History: L. 1973, ch. 208, § 5.

78-27-37. Comparative negligence—Diminishment of damages—"Contributory negligence" includes "assumption of the risk."—Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence or gross negligence resulting in
death or in injury to person or property, if such negligence was not as great
as the negligence or gross negligence of the person against whom recovery
is sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in the proportion
to the amount of negligence attributable to the person recovering. As used
in this act, "contributory negligence" includes "assumption of the risk."
History: L. 1973, ch. 209, § 1.
- .^
Title of Act.
An act relating to actions for the recovery of damages in actions based on
negligence or gross negligence; removing
contributory negligence as a bar to any
recovery under certain circumstances; providing for the diminishing of any recovery
in proportion to the negligence of the
person seeking recovery; providing for
separate judgments as to damages and
proportionate negligence; providing for
contribution among joint tort-feasors; providing for the release of one or more
joint tort-feasors without releasing them
all; and providing for the effect of such
m i

releases on other joint
1973, ch. 209.

tort-feasors.—L.

Cross-Beference.
Product Liability Act, manufacturer or
seller not liable if alteration or modification of product after sale is substantial
contributing cause of injury, 78-15-5.
^aw Reviews.
Comment, McGinn v. Utah Power &
Light Co.—Jury Blindfolding in Comparative Negligence Cases, 1975 Utah L. Rev.
569.
Note, A Primer on Damages under the
Utah Wrongful Death and Survival Statutes, 1974 Utah L. Rev. 519.

78-27-38. Separate special verdicts on damages and percentage of negligence—Reduction of damages.—The court may, and when requested by
any party shall, direct the jury to find separate special verdicts determining
(1) the total amount of damages suffered and (2) the percentage of negligence attributable to each party; and the court shall then reduce the amount
of the damages in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to
the person seeking recovery.
History: L. 1973, ch. 209, § 2.

78-27-39. Contribution among joint tort-feasors—Discharge of common
liability by joint tort-feasor required.—(1) The right of contribution shall
exist among joint tort-feasors, but a joint tort-feasor shall not be entitled
348

App. i i

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

78-27-37

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Key Numbers. — Release *» 25 et seq.

78-27-35, Release, settlement, or statement by injured person — Notice of rescission or disavowal.
Notice of cancellation or notice disavowing a statement, if given by mail, is
given when it is deposited in a mailbox, properly addressed with postage
prepaid. Notice of cancellation given by the injured person need not take a
particular form and is sufficient if it indicates by any form of written expression the intention of the injured person not to be bound by the settlement
agreement, liability release, or disavowed statement.
History: L. 1973, ch. 208, § 4.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 66 Am. Jur. 2d § 14 et seq.
C.J.S. — 76 C.J.S. § 38 et seq.

78-27-36, Right of rescission or disavowal of release, settlement, or statement by injured person in addition to other provisions.
The rights provided by this act are intended to be in addition to, and not in
lieu of, any rights of rescission, rules of evidence, or provisions otherwise
existing in the law.
History: L. 1973, ch. 208, § 5.
Meaning of "this act". — See note following same catchline in notes to § 78-27-36.

78-27-37. Definitions.
As used in §§ 78-27-37 through 78-27-43:
(1) "Defendant" means any person not immune from suit who is
claimed to be liable because of fault to any person seeking recovery.
(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of legal duty, act, or omission
proximately causing or contributing to injury or damages sustained by a
person seeking recovery, including, but not limited to, negligence in all
its degrees, contributory negligence, assumption of risk, strict liability,
breach of express or implied warranty of a product, products liability, and
misuse, modification or abuse of a product.
(3) "Person seeking recovery" means any person seeking damages or
reimbursement on its own behalf, or on behalf of another for whom it is
authorized to act as legal representative.
History: C. 1953, 78-27-37, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 199, § 1.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986,
ch. 1989, § 1 repeals former § 78-27-37, as en-

acted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 1, relating to
diminishment of damages and assumption of
risk, and reenacts the above section,

425
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78-27-38

JUDICIAL CODE

78-27-38. Comparative negligence.
The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone bar recovery by that
person. He may recover from any defendant or group of defendants whose
fault exceeds his own. However, no defendant is liable to any person seeking
recovery for any amount in excess of the proportion of fault attributable to
that defendant.
History: C. 1953, 78-27-38, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 199, § 2.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986,
ch. 199, § 2 repeals former § 78-27-38, as enacted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 2, relating to
special verdicts, and reenacts the above section.

Cross-References. — Product Liability Act,
manufacturer or seller not liable if alteration
or modification of product after sale is substantial contributing cause of injury, § 78-15-5.
Skiers not to make claim against or recover
from ski area operator for injury resulting from
any inherent risk of skiing, § 78-27-53.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Assumption of risk.
Bailment.
Causation.
J u r y instructions.
Last clear chance.
Unit method of determining negligence.
Cited.
Assumption of risk.
"Assumption of risk," i.e., risk of a known
danger voluntarily assumed, may amount to a
lack of due care constituting negligence; where
such is the case and the party assuming the
risk is the plaintiff in an action governed by
comparative negligence statute, he is chargeable with contributory negligence and is liable
to have his recovery reduced or denied in accordance with its provisions. Rigtrup v. Strawberry Water Users Ass'n, 563 P.2d 1247 (Utah
1977).
Assumption of risk language is not appropriate to describe the various concepts previously
dealt with under that terminology but is to be
treated, in its secondary sense, as contributory
negligence; when the issue is raised attention
should be focused on whether a reasonably prudent man in the exercise of due care would
have incurred the risk, despite his knowledge
of it, and if so, whether he would have conducted himself in the manner in which the person seeking to recover acted in light of all the
surrounding circumstances, including the appreciated risk; then, if the unreasonableness of
the person seeking to recover is viewed to be
less than that of the person from whom recovery is sought, any damages allowed should be
diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person recovering.

Jacobsen Constr. Co. v. Structo-Lite Eng'g,
Inc., 619 P.2d 306 (Utah 1980).
As used in § 78-27-37, "assumption of risk"
is a voluntary and unreasonable exposure to a
known danger. Moore v. Burton Lumber &
Hdwe. Co., 631 P.2d 865 (Utah 1981).
Bailment
The comparative negligence statutes do not
change the rule that the negligence of a bailee
in handling the bailed property is not imputed
to the bailor. Otto v. Leany, 635 P.2d 410
(Utah 1981).
Causation.
Trial court committed prejudicial error in
submitting to jury question of plaintiffs comparative negligence where his act of alleged
negligence did not in any way contribute to his
injury, although it may have increased severity of damages; comparative negligence becomes a defense for defendant where plaintiffs
negligent conduct was a contributing factor in
causing injury. Acculog, Inc. v. Peterson, 692
P.2d 728 (Utah 1984).
Jury instructions.
If requested, a trial court must inform the
jury of the legal consequences of apportioning
to the plaintiff 50% or more of the negligence it
finds in a comparative negligence case, if the
effect of such an instruction will not be to con-

426
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Code«Co
Ptovo, Utah

compensation jaw. in Bryan, this Court held that denied the motion. The court also refused to
one who intentionally injures a fellow employee may give certain instructions requested by Hendebe separately liable to the injured worker. In such a rson. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff
case, the employer would be liable only for the in the amount of $17,357.92/ finding John
benefits provided unaer the Workers' Compensation Doe 75 percent negligent, Henderson/Classic
Act and could not be required to respond as the
offending employee's superior. In Shell Oil, we held Skating Center 25 percent negligent, and plathat a contract whereby a joint venturer agreed to intiff free from any negligence. On August 15r
indemnify his partner against liabilities incurred on 1986, plaintiff executed against Henderson for
the joint venture jobsite was enforceable, though the the entire amount of the judgment.
contract resulted in an employer's agreement to
In 1986, the legislature repealed the Compaccept liability in excess of the compensation due arative Negligence Act, Utah Code Ann. §§
under the Act, where the partner's negligence resu- .78-27-37 to -43, and replaced it with the
lted in injury to the joint venturer's own employee.
Liability Reform Act. Utah Code Ann. §§
78-27-37 tor -43, as reenacted. The Liability Reform Act did not expressly direct that
any of its provisions should operate retroactively. Section 78-27-40 of that Act provides
Cite as
in part: *[T]he maximum amount for which a
63 Utah Adv. Rep. 10
defendant may be liable to any person seeking
IN THE SUPREME COURT
recovery is that percentage or proportion of
the damages equivalent to the percentage or
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
proportion of fault attributed to that defenJoan F. STEPHENS,
dant." In contrast, the Comparative NegligPlaintiff and Respondent,
ence Act provided for joint and several liabiv.
lity, that is, each defendant was liable to the
Brent HENDERSON, dba Classic Skating
plaintiff for the full amount of the plaintiffs
Center, and John Doe,
damages.
Defendants and Appellant.
Henderson contends that, the Liability
Reform Act, eliminating joint and. several
No. 860440
liability, should have been applied in this case.
On the other hand, Stephens asserts that doing
FHED: August 13,1987
so would have effected an impermissible retrFOURTH DISTRICT
"7~"
oactive result.
Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen
The starting point for our analysis is Utah
Code Ann. § 68-3-3, which provides: "No
ATTORNEYS:
part of these revised statutes is retroactive,
Carman E. Kipp, Salt Lake City, for
unless expressly so declared." The application
Appellant
of a statute is retroactive if it alters the subsRay Harding Ivie, Ray Phillips Ivie, and
tantive law on which the parties relied. See
Docutel Olivetti Corp. v. Dick Brady Systems,
James G. Clark* Provo, for Respondent
Inc., 731 P .2d 475 (Utah.1986); see also Petty
HOWE, Justice:
v. Clark, 113 Utah 205,192 P.2d 589 (1948); cf.
This is an appeal from a judgment on a jury Archer v. Utah State Land Board, 15 Utah
verdict in a negligence action. Defendant Srent 2d 321, 392 P.2d 622 (1964). Law is substanHenderson dba Classic Skating Center asserts tive if it "creates, defines and regulates the
that the trial judge committed reversible error rights and duties of the parties and ... may
in refusing to give certain jury instructions give rise to a cause for action, as distinguished
requested by him and in refusing to apply the from adjective law which pertains to and
provisions of the Liability Reform Act. Utah prescribes the practice and procedure or the
78-27-37 to ?-43 as legal machinery by which the substantive, law
:Code'Mnn.^§§
is determined or made effective." Perry w
amended in 19S6.
On November 8, 1984, plaintiff Joan Step- Clark, 192 P.2d at 593-94. Other: jurisdicthens injured her wrist when she fell after being ions have held similar statutes to be substantripped by an unknown skater while she was tive. Russell v. Superior Court, 185 Cal. ,App.
roller. :skatmg at Classic Skating Center in 3d 810, 230. CaL Rptr^lOZ (CaL.App. 1st
X)rem;^ JJtah/ Stephens>^illed '• suiter naming [ Dist. 1986) :(hoiding Proposition Sl^wnich
Henderson'and * John ! Doe*^ as * defendants. eliminated joint and several liability for nonTrial wa* held on July' 29, 1986, At the close economic damages, to have prospective-effect
of : plaintiff'sfcase^ 7 ; Henderson^ counsel only); see also United States.Fidelity & .Gusimoved to apply the ^Liability Reform Act, anty Co.'.v. Park City Corp,,,397..F^'SETOwhich became^ effective April 28* 1986UAppl- 411^ 414-15 (D^ Or^ 1973)/ CPIhe* j^iadonication of: the Act would have Held each def- ship'between the pardes'is.J^eH^of the date
endant! liable: for damages only in proportion of. the faccidenV It is 'M that .tfi^ that-these
to - his own individual fault.^The trial court parties became joint tortfeasors.^Their .rights
and obligations as among themselves are
For complete Utah Code Annotations, consult Code#Co's Annotation Service
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-governed by the then existing substantive law contribution arose by statute after the acciu::/)y kfrd, 526 F.2d 1120 (9th Cir. 1975).
; dent, the statute creating the right could not
In the instant case, the Comparative Negli- apply. Our holding in that case was reiterated
gence Act was the substantive law defining, in in Unigard Insurance Co. v. City of LaVerkin,
jpart, the relationship between the parties at 689 P.2d 1344 (Utah 1984), where we stated
the time of the accident. Section 78-27-41 that Brunyer stands for the proposition that
provided, "Nothing in this act shall affect: (1) "the act was not applicable in any Tespect to
the common-law liability of the several joint any liability for injuries occurring prior to the
tort-feasors to have judgment recovered, and effect [sic] date of the statute/ Id. at 1347
payment mader from them individually by. the n,3. A statute eliminating joint and several
injured person for the whole injury." The liability may not be applied to injuries occurLiability Reform Act redefines the relationship ring prior to its effective date. The injuries in
between the plaintiff and the joint tort- this case occurred on November 8, 1984; the
feasors. Since the Act changes the substantive Liability Reform Act was not effective until
law in effect when plaintiffs cause of action April 28, 1986. Therefore, the trial court was
"arose,-its application would have retroactive correct in holding that the Liability Reform
effect. That being the case, section 68-3-3 Act did not apply;
dictates that it may not be applied unless
: Henderson next contends that the trial court
expressly so directed by the legislature. The erred in failing to give his requested jury ins'Liability Reform Act contains no such express truction No. 21:
direction.
There is a legal principle, comWe note Henderson's argument for an altmonly referred to by the term
ernate method to determine if a legislative act
'assumption of risk", which is as
, is retroactive. He asserts that there is no retr- J
follows:
bactive effect if a new statute takes effect
•One is said to assume a risk when
before judgment is entered in the case.
he voluntarily manifests his assent
However, we have long held that a party may
to a dangerous condition or to the
not be deprived of a right simply because
creation or maintenance of a danjudgment has not yet been entered. To* paragerous condition and voluntarily
phrase our holding in Buttrey v. Guaranteed
exposes himself to that danger, or
Securities Co., 78 Utah 39, 300 P. 1040
when he knows, or in the exercise
(1931), a case involving the repeal of a statute
of ordinary care would know, that
holding corporate directors individually liable
a danger exists in the condition of
to stockholders, cases which hold that a statthe property and voluntarily places
utorily created right can be destroyed at any
himself or remains within the positime until final judgment because the right has
tion of danger.
not yet vested, are in error. Id. at 1045. To
If you find that Joan Stephens
: allow the substantive law in a case to be
assumed the risks -which .were
changed at any time up until entry of final
known by her or which should have
judgment would allow a plaintiff to be effecbeen known by her concerning the
tively deprived of a cause of actioni Campbell
dangers associated with roller
v. Stagg, 596 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1979), cited by
skating, she would be : „• guilty - of
Henderson as authority, is inapposite. In that
negligencecase, we were presented with the question We held in Jacobsen Construction Co. v.
rwhether it was permissible to include interest Structo-Lite Engineering, 619 P.2d 306 (Utah
"on a judgment for a plaintiffs damages from 1980), that assumption-of-risk language is
the time of the injury, even though the statute not appropriate under our comparative negli1 aliowing^ such interest became effective after gence statutes. As was illustrated by that case,
'..'the accident giving rise, to the injuries. In assumption of the risk in its secondary sense,
holding that result permissible, we noted that as used in the requested instruction, is to be
Jhe legislature, 'expUddy directed all [future] treated as contributory negligence. Id; at 312.
judgments to add interest computet! from the I The jury was given instructions on contributime of the act giving rise to the accident.*Id. I torjr negligence; therefore, the trial court was
:at^l042.^There is noanalogous^statutory Ian-r correct in refusing defendant's^requested insguagem the liability Reform A c t 5 ^ - l ^ ^ i f c f F iructionNol21:
^ Our determinarioa that. application of the | '^Henderson lastly contends Jthat the trial
liability Reform Act would be impermissibly court erred in refusing to give his requested
retroactive^in,this^c^is.Teinforced by,our instruction No. ll, which read:
^decision in Brunycrv* Salt Lake County, ;551
Should you :rdetermine^that the
jPJd 521 (Utah 1976).' In/that case,! we were
plaintiff %as ; deliberately ^knocked
• ^confronted;. withJ whether^, thc[ t Comparative ;
down,* you Jare instructed* that a
Negligence Act should apply to allow contri- |
roller skating proprietor has a duty
bution between tort-feasors who had negli- j
to guard roller.skaters,jagainst assgently injured the plaintiff before the effective j
date of the act. We held that since the right to
For complete Utah Code Annotations, consult Code* Co's Annotation Service
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aults by fellow roller skaters if the
eable, even anticipated, and floor guards were
circumstances are such that an
assigned to watch for and immediately stop
ordinarily prudent person might
the very conduct which injured plaintiff.
reasonably anticipate the danger of
Affirmed.
such assaults and knew or should
1
have known of the tendency of a
WE CONCUR:
fellow skater to assault other
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice
patrons of the establishment.
Christine M. Durham, Justice
Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice
Henderson points out that plaintiffs fnena
Gregory K. Orme, Court of Appeals Judge
who accompanied her to the roller rink testified that the unknown skater, after knocking
Stewart, Associate Chief Justice, does
plaintiff down, yelled, *l scored another/ She not participate herein; Orme, Court of
further testified that she had seen him knock Appeals Judge, sat.
down another skater moments before he made
contact with plaintiff. Henderson argues that
this testimony indicates that plaintiff was intentionally assaulted and that consequently
Gte as
requested instruction No. 27 was necessary to
63 Utah Adv. Rep. 12
instruct the jury as to the duty Henderson
owed plaintiff to protect her against intentiIN THE SUPREME COURT
onal torts by other patrons.
OF THE STATE OF U T A H
We find no prejudicial error in the refusal
to give this instruction. It is true, as asserted
by Henderson, that a proprietor, to be held RDG ASSOCIATES/JORMAN
liable, must have some cause to believe that CORPORATION,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
one patron may assault another patron. Gusv.
tzveson v. Gregg, 655 P.2d 693 (Utah 1982).
Nevertheless, under the facts here such an The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Utah,
defendant and Appellant,
instruction was not required since the instruv.
ctions given covered this subject, Henderson
Atkinson,
Eddy
R., et a!.,
had two floor guards assigned to monitor the
Employees.
skating and to warn or remove those skaters
who indulged in unsafe practices, such as
racing, pushing, or rowdy behavior. The ins- No. 860003
tructions given by the court informed the jury FILED: August 13, 1987
that it was the theory of plaintiffs case that
Henderson was negligent because his floor THIRD DISTRICT
guards failed to properly supervise the skating Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup
of other patrons of the rink. The jury was ATTORNEYS:
further instructed that the proprietor of a John T. Anderson, Salt Lake City, for
public amusement has the duty to use ordinary
Respondent
care and diligence to protect patrons, but this Theodore L. Cannon, Jay Stone, Salt Lake
duty does not extend to becoming an insurer
City, for Appellant
of their safety. Negligence was defined. Under
the facts of this case, Henderson's duty to
protect plaintiff from those who would inte- STEWART, Associate Chief Justice:
ntionally trip her was not different than the I This is an appeal from a summary judgment
duty to protect heir from those who would I entered by the district court against the Indunegligently or recklessly run into her. The strial Commission in an action to enforce its
floor guards were there to monitor all skaters. orders' against RDG Associates/Jorman
Requested instruction No. 27 was properly Corporation (RDG) for wages not paid by T &
refused as surplusage since other instructions I K Steel, Inc. <T & X), to its employees- The
adequately covered the duty owed to plaintiff I issue is whether an owner-developer of land
to protect her from the .errant conduct of who contracts with a builder for the construOther skaters* irrespective of how that conduct I ction of an improvement on the owner's land
inight be characterized. This case, is jmlike I is liable for the unpaid wages of the builder's
Custevcson y. Gregg, $upra,~ where the desk t employees under the Utah -Wage Payment
clerk in a bowling alley who had no respons- I Statute, Utah Code Ann. § 34-28-8 (1974).
1 Sixty-three employees of T & K assigned
ibility to monitor the conduct of patrons had
no reason to believe that an argument might I their rights to unpaid wages to the Industrial
erupt between two patrons and that one might I Commission for collection pursuant to § 34punch the other in the face. In that case, we 28-13.^ The employees worked for T & K
held the proprietor not liable as a matter of [ while it performed a construction contract for
law. In the instant case, the peril was forese- RDG, an owner-developer of land.
*
'
For complete Utah Code Annotations, consult Code • Co's Annotation Service
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fit to testify in his own behalf, and the jury
was not obligated to believe his testimony.
Defendant points to the lack of direct
testimony that the automobile was operational at the time of its theft. Inasmuch as
it was uncontradicted that the automobile
was stolen between 8:00 and 10:30 p. m. and
was observed being driven into defendant's
shed at 11:30 p. m. on the same evening, the
jury was at liberty to infer that it was
operational at the time of the theft.
Defendant also contends that the only
evidence connecting him to the theft was
his possession of the recently stolen automobile. However, the record contains other
corroborative evidence, not the least of
which is the following: 1) defendant's own
explanation of his possession, 2) his concealment of the automobile and partial dismantlement, 3) his false claim of ownership and
evidence of title, and 4) his admission to
Detective Leonard of his knowledge that
the automobile was stolen.14
The conviction and judgment are
firmed.

af-

HOWE, J., and CALVIN GOULD, District Judge, concur.
STEWART, J., concurs in the result.
MAUGHAN, C. J., does not participate
herein; GOULD, District Judge, sat.
CROCKETT, J., heard the arguments,
but retired before the opinion was written.

Paul T. MOORE, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.

BURTON LUMBER & HARDWARE
COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.
No. 16672.
Supreme Court of Utah.
May 22, 1981.
Defendant appealed from judgment of
the Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
David K. Winder, J., based on jury's special
verdict which found defendant liable for
personal injuries sustained by plaintiff
while operating a radial arm saw on defendant's business premises. The Supreme
Court, Stewart, J., held that: (1) although
trial court should have instructed that there
was no duty to warn an invitee of an obvious danger so as to have avoided any possible misunderstanding, failure to do so was
harmless; (2) since duty of plaintiff and
consequences of a breach thereof were explained to jury in appropriate language,
there was no error in not giving an instruction on secondary assumption of risk in
addition to a contributory negligence instruction; and (3) there was substantial evidence in record to support jury's findings,
and thus trial court did not err in failing to
instruct jury that, as a matter of law, plaintiff was negligent and that the negligence
was sole cause of the injury, or alternatively that it was a proximate cause of the
injury.
Affirmed.

iYSTEM>
KEY HuMBiR SYSTEM

Hall, J., dissented and filed opinion in
which Crockett, J., concurred.
1. Appeal and Error < ^ 1063(5)
Products Liability <s=>96
In action to recover for injuries sustained when plaintiff was using radial arm

14. See State v. Kinsey, 77 Utah 348, 295 P. 247
(1931); State v. Thomas, 121 Utah 639, 244
P.2d 653 (1952).
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saw on defendant's business premises, trial
court, in order to avoid any possible misunderstanding by jury, should have instructed
that there was no duty to warn an invitee
of an obvious danger, but failure to do so
was harmless, because, in light of specific
findings of jury that plaintiff was negligent
but that his negligence was not a proximate
cause of the injury and that defendant was
negligent and that its negligence was a
proximate cause of the injury, there was no
reasonable likelihood that there would have
been a result more favorable to defendant
had the instruction been given as requested.
2. Trial <s=*358
A jury's answers to special interrogatories must, if at all possible, be read harmoniously.
3. Negligence <s=*67, 105
A plaintiff's failure to foresee a danger
which a reasonable person acting in a prudent manner would have foreseen is "designated negligent conduct," whereas "assumption of risk" designates conduct of a
person who unreasonably takes a known
and appreciated risk.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
4. Negligence <s=»105
"Assumption of risk," as that term is
used in statute providing that contributory
negligence shall not bar recovery in a negligence action, is a voluntary and unreasonable exposure to a known danger. U.C.A.
1953, 78-27-37.
5. Negligence <s=>97
"Secondary assumption of risk," which
is the unreasonable encountering of a
known and appreciated risk and in reality
an aspect of contributory negligence, is
treated in same manner as contributory
negligence for purpose of apportioning
fault under comparative negligence statute.
U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
1. Deal's lumber was purchased out of state and
stored at Intermountain Lumber ("Intermoun-

6. Trial <s=>260(8)
In action to recover for injuries sustained when plaintiff was using radial arm
saw on defendant's business premises, there
was no error in not giving an instruction on
secondary assumption of risk in addition to
a contributory negligence instruction since
duty of plaintiff and consequences of a
breach thereof were explained to jury in
appropriate language; overruling Rigtrup
v. Strawberry Water Users Ass'n., 563 P.2d
1247, U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37.
7. Products Liability <s»85, 96
There was substantial evidence in record to support findings of jury that defendant was liable for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff while operating radial
arm saw on defendant's business premises,
and thus trial court correctly refused to
instruct jury that,-as a matter of law, plaintiff was negligent and that the negligence
was sole cause of the injury, or alternatively that it was a proximate cause of the
injury.
Raymond M. Berry, Brucett Jensen, Salt
Lake City, for defendant and appellant.
W. Eugene Hansen, Ralph L. Dewsnup,
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent.
STEWART, Justice:
Defendant appeals from a judgment
based on a jury's special verdict which
found defendant liable for personal injuries
sustained by plaintiff while operating a radial arm saw on defendant's business premises.
During approximately a two-year period,
from June 1973 to May 1975, plaintiff supervised a large building project for Deal
Development Company ("Deal") in Salt
Lake City. Deal had an open account with
defendant which was used in charging
hardware items purchased for the project.1
Shortly before noon on May 1, 1975,
plaintiff and one Buddy Prince, a fellow
tain"), several blocks away from defendant's
business premises.
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employee of Deal, drove to defendant's
business premises in plaintiffs pickup
truck. Their purpose was to buy some
hardware items and to ask permission to
use defendant's radial arm saw to cut several two-by-fours into blocks to be used in
enclosing air-conditioning ducts.
While
Prince gathered the hardware items, plaintiff went to the front desk to seek permission to use the radial arm saw. There is
substantial conflict in the evidence as to
what thereafter transpired. 2
Plaintiff apparently spoke with defendant's office manager who quoted plaintiff a
price per cut for the use of the saw, but no
set price was agreed upon. Plaintiff testified that thereafter someone told him to
check with the yardmen and that if the saw
was not being used, it would be all right for
him to use it.
Plaintiff went out into the yard and told
a yardman by the name of Jessie that he
had been given permission to use the saw.
Jessie led plaintiff to the saw shed, where
plaintiff offered to give Jessie a six-pack of
beer if he would change the blade before
plaintiff got back from Intermountain
Lumber with the lumber to be cut. Jessie
allegedly agreed, and plaintiff and Prince
then drove to Intermountain where they
picked up the two-by-fours they planned to
cut into blocks. Plaintiff claims they
stopped at a small store where they bought
the beer promised to Jessie. They then
returned to defendant's business premises
and entered through the back gate.
Plaintiff entered the saw shed and noticed that the saw had been reset from the
ripping position to the cross-cut position.
He then measured the length he wanted to
cut and drove a nail into the table for use
as a gauge so that he would not have to
measure each cut separately.
Plaintiff
started the saw and cut the first two-byfour by placing its end against the nail
gauge, pulling the saw toward him and
returning it, then knocking the cut block
2. Defendant and its employees dispute plaintiffs claim that he received permission to use
the saw. For the purposes of this appeal, we
view the facts in the light most favorable to the

out of the way, and moving his two-by-four
up to the nail gauge to repeat the process.
This procedure was following approximately seven to nine times.
When he finished cutting the first twoby-four, plaintiff pushed the saw back to its
return position and went to the end of the
table to get the second two-by-four. He
took hold of the second two-by-four with
both hands and moved it along the table in
front of a one-by-four which served as a
guide. Plaintiff momentarily directed his
attention to the nail gauge on the table to
make sure the two-by-four abutted it, when
suddenly the saw cut his hand. Before he
could pull his hand away from the saw, his
thumb and his index and middle fingers of
his right hand were severed, and his remaining two fingers were severely cut.
There is no evidence that the blade of the
saw cut through the board and then into
plaintiff's fingers, or that plaintiff either
manually pulled the saw into a cutting position, or that he moved his hand into the
saw, as is speculated by the dissent. Nor is
there evidence that the manner in which
plaintiff placed his hand on the board was
improper.
The testimony at trial included evidence
that the radial arm saw had been in use on
defendant's premises for over thirty years
without an accident. There was a sign
hanging on the wall opposite the saw which
read in large yellow letters, "For Use of
Authorized Operator Only." Plaintiff testified to having had experience operating
such saws, and, although he admitted that
such saws are, by their very nature, extremely dangerous, he claimed he was competent to operate the saw without any instruction or assistance.
The evidence indicated that the saw was
equipped with a hood guard which serves to
control direction of the sawdust produced
by cutting wood; it is not designed to be a
safety guard but could be rotated down
against most thicknesses of lumber. Plainverdict. Berkeley Bank for Cooperatives v.
Meibos, Utah, 607 P.2d 798 (1980); Rodgers v.
Hansen, Utah, 580 P.2d 233 (1973).
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tiffs expert testified that the hood guard
was not an adequate blade guard, that is, a
guard designed to prevent the operator of
the saw from coming into contact with the
saw blade. International standards for
blade guards require that such guards permit no more than % inch clearance between
the bottom of the guard and the saw table
when the blade is exposed. Even if the
hood guard were rotated down, once the
lumber was cut the clearance between the
bottom of the guard and the table would
exceed % inch. Thus, even had plaintiff
rotated the hood guard down so that it
would contact the two-by-four being cut,
the guard would not have prevented plaintiff's hand from being drawn into the blade
of the saw.
In addition, plaintiffs expert testified
that the saw in question was not equipped
with a system to prevent the spinning blade
from creeping forward from its rest position. A large spinning blade will creep
forward unless it is restrained, either mechanically or by gravity. In a mechanical
restraint system a spring or a pulley and
weight system holds the blade in the maximum rearward position. The same result
can be obtained by simply tilting the front
of the table slightly so that gravity keeps
the blade in the proper rest position. In the
opinion of plaintiff's expert, the lack of
proper blade guards and a blade restraining
system rendered the saw in question "defective and unreasonably dangerous."
A special verdict was returned finding
both plaintiff and defendant negligent, but,
significantly, the jury also found plaintiffs
negligence not to have been a cause of the
injury. The jury also found that plaintiff
was a business invitee and not a licensee or
trespasser and assessed damages in the
amount of $144,892. The court entered
judgment in that amount against defenda n t Defendant's motion for a new trial
was denied, and this appeal followed.
[1] Defendant's first claim on appeal is
that the trial court prejudicially erred in
refusing to instruct the jury that there is no
duty to warn a business invitee of an obvious danger. Specifically, defendant argues

that because one instruction informed the
jury that there was no duty to warn licensees of obvious dangers, the failure to give
such an instruction with respect to invitees
may have led the jury to believe erroneously that defendant should have warned
plaintiff as to obvious dangers. Defendant
also claims that the trial court erred in
failing to instruct on the defense of assumption of risk and in refusing to submit
that defense to the jury for a finding in the
special verdict.
There are of course certain risks which
anyone of adult age must be taken to appreciate. Wold v. Ogden City, 123 Utah
270, 258 P.2d 453 (1953); Prosser, Handbook
of the Law of Torts (4th ed.) § 61 p. 394, see
also § 68 p. 448. It has long been held that
a property owner has no obligation to warn
an invitee of dangers which are known to
the invitee or which are so obvious and
apparent that he may reasonably be expected to discover them. Defendant specifically
contends that the evidence supported its
theory that the dangers were obvious and
that the defendant therefore had no duty to
warn plaintiff of such dangers.
Under the circumstances of this case, the
trial court should have instructed that there
was no duty to warn an invitee of an obvious danger so as to have avoided any possible misunderstanding. Steele v. Denver &
Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, 16
Utah 2d 127, 396 P.2d 751 (1964); see also
EUertson v. Dansie, Utah, 576 P.2d 867
(1978). Nevertheless, the failure to do so
was harmless.
There was no evidence that the specific
dangers for which the defendant could be
held responsible and which could have
caused the injury—the lack of certain blade
guards and the creeping of the saw—were
such obvious and common hazards as to be
apparent to a layman or one with plaintiffs
background. The evidence which did relate
to the obviousness of the danger of the saw
went to its inherent danger rather than the
specific dangers created by the lack of
blade guards and the tendency of the saw
to creep forward. As to these defects,
there was expert testimony that the saw
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was defective and unreasonably dangerous.
But there was no testimony that the creeping was obvious to one in plaintiffs shoes or
that the plaintiff knew or should have
known about the availability of the blade
guards.
[2] In answer to a special interrogatory,
the jurors specifically found that plaintiff
was negligent, but that his negligence was
not a proximate cause of the injury. On
the other hand, the jury specifically found
that defendant was negligent and that its
negligence was a proximate cause of the
injury. To accept defendant's theory that
the injury resulted from the failure to warn
or correct an obvious danger would result in
a finding that plaintiff's negligence was a
proximate cause of the injury—in direct
conflict with the jury's finding on proximate cause. The jury's responses to the
special interrogatories are consistent only
on the proposition that the injury resulted
from a nonobvious danger. Therefore, because a jury's answers to special interrogatories must, if at all possible, be read harmoniously, Weber Basin Water Conservancy Dist. v. Nelson, 11 Utah 2d 253, 358 P.2d
81 (1960); Van Cleve v. Betts, 16 Wash.
App. 748, 559 P.2d 1006 (1977), and in light
of the presumption that the jury followed
the instructions, we must reject defendant's
theory. Clearly, under the instructions, the
jury could have found plaintiffs negligence
a proximate cause but chose not to do so.

Mitchell Funeral Home Ambulance
Utah, 606 P.2d 259 (1980).

Serv.,

The next issue arises out of the trial
court's refusal to instruct the jury on assumption of risk. Both plaintiff and defendant submitted proposed instructions on
the issue. The judge's rationale for his
ruling was- as follows:
I think it is a negligence case, is what it
is, a comparative negligence case. I
think the instructions ought to be limited
to that, excluding assumption of the risk
which, under comparative negligence, is
part of comparative [contributory] negligence.
Undoubtedly, in so ruling the court had in
mind § 78-27-37 U.C.A. (1953), which provides:
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or his
legal representative to recover damages
for negligence or gross negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or
property, if such negligence was not as
great as the negligence or gross negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed
shall be diminished in the proportion to
the amount of negligence attributable to
the person recovering. As used in this
act, "contributory negligence" includes
"assumption of the risk."

In sum, although Instruction 22 did not
state that defendant had a duty to warn of
obvious dangers, 3 the error was harmless
because there was no "reasonable likelihood
. . . that . . . there would have been a result more favorable" to defendant had the
instruction been as requested. Rowley v.
Graven Bros. & Co., 26 Utah 2d 448, 451,
491 P.2d 1209, 1211 (1971). See also Lee v.

With time it has become clear that the
assumption of risk defense in fact included
at least three different legal concepts. See
Jacobsen Construction Co. v. Structo-Lite
Engineering, Inc., Utah, 619 P.2d 306
(1980), and authorities there cited. One
form of assumption of risk has been referred to by some as primary assumption of
risk, which may be either expressed or implied. The "primary express" form involves
an agreement by the plaintiff to accept the

3. Instruction No. 22, which was given by the
court, stated:
If you find by a preponderance of the evidence that, at the time of his injury, Mr.
Moore was defendant's "business invitee," as
that term is defined hereinafter, then defendant's duty to Mr. Moore was to refrain from
any acts of negligence toward him; to exercise reasonable care to keep the premises,

including the radial arm saw thereon, in a
condition reasonably safe for purposes consistent with his presence there: and to warn
him of any and aii dangers involving the
operation of szid saw which were known to
the defendant or should have become known
to the defendant in the exercise of reasonable
diligence and the performance of reasonable
inspections.
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risk or danger, and the "primary implied"
form involves a relationship in which defendant simply owes no duty of care to the
plaintiff. Secondary assumption of risk is,
as stated, the unreasonable encountering of
a known and appreciated risk and in reality
an aspect of contributory negligence.
Rigtrup v. Strawberry Water User's Ass'n,
Utah, 563 P.2d 1247 (1977); Jacobsen Construction Co. v. Structo-Lite
Engineering,
Inc., supra.
[3] Both assumption of risk and contributory negligence are founded on unreasonable conduct. Each concept focuses on a
different aspect of unreasonableness in the
face of a risk of harm. A plaintiff's failure
to foresee a danger which a reasonable person acting in a prudent manner would have
foreseen is designated negligent conduct.
Assumption of risk designates conduct of a
person who unreasonably takes a known
and appreciated risk.
[4, 5] Assumption of risk, as that term is
used in § 78-27-37, is a voluntary and
unreasonable exposure to a known danger.
Jacobsen Construction Company v. StructoLite Engineering, Inc., supra. The complete bar to recovery in an action for negligence, which assumption of risk has been
historically, has been lifted by the Utah
comparative negligence statute to avoid the
harshness visited upon plaintiffs as a result
of the all-or-nothing nature of the former
rule of law.4 Secondary assumption of risk
is treated in the same manner as contributory negligence for the purpose of apportioning fault under the comparative negligence statute.
Rigtrup v.
Strawberry
Water User's Ass% Utah, 563 P.2d 1247
(1977). The relationship between the two
concepts was explained in Jacobsen Construction Company v. Structo-Lite
Engineering, Inc., supra at 312:
. . . the reasonableness of plaintiffs conduct in confronting a known or unknown
risk created by defendant's negligence
will basically be determined under principles of contributory negligence. Atten4. Comparative pnncipies as to a plaintiffs and
defendant's liability in causing personal injury
were recently held to apply in strict liability

tion should be focused on whether a reasonably prudent man in the exercise of
due care would have incurred the risk,
despite his knowledge of it, and if so,
whether he would have conducted himself
in the manner in which the plaintiff acted
in light of all the surrounding circumstances, including the appreciated risk.
See Leavitt v. Gillaspie, Alaska, 443 P.2d
61 (1968). Then, if plaintiff's unreasonableness is viewed to be less than that of
defendant, according to the terms of the
statute, "any damages allowed shall be
diminished in proportion to the amount of
negligence attributable to the person recovering." [Footnote omitted.]
In light of the difficulties arising from
the several meetings, of the term assumption of risk, some authorities have advocated the complete abolition of the term "assumption of risk" and the utilization of
other legal terminology to describe the conduct. See 2 Harper and James, Law of
Torts § 21.8 at 1191-92 (1956); Flemming,
Law of Torts, 241-58 (2nd ed. 1961). We
agree.
Defendant maintains that Rigtrup v.
Strawberry Water Users Ass'n, Utah, 563
P.2d 1247 (1977), held that assumption of
risk is still a complete bar to recovery.
Insofar as that part of assumption of risk
which is an aspect of contributory negligence is concerned, that case did not so
hold. Rigtrup recognized that "where there
is a known danger, the risk of which is
voluntarily assumed by a party, such action
may well fall within the lack of due care
which constitutes negligence and may also
be correctly termed an assumption of risk."
[563 P.2d at 1250.] The Court referred to
the statutory language that "contributory
negligence includes assumption of risk" under the comparative negligence statute and
stated that the statute "indicates a clear
legislative intent to recognize the doctrine
of 'assumption of risk* as an aspect of contributory negligence in Utah law." [Ibid.]
The Court held assumption of risk should be
cases. Mulherin v. IngersoH-Rand Co., Utah,
628 P.2d 1301 (1931).

MOORE v. BURTON LUMBER & HARDWARE CO.

Utah

871

Cite as, Utah, S31 P^d 865

treated in a comparative manner as an aspect of contributory negligence. Nevertheless, the Court did approve the giving of
instructions on both assumption of risk and
contributory negligence.
[6] Even though decided after the appeal in this case, the principles governing
the relationship of contributory negligence
and assumption of risk enunciated in Jacobsen are controlling here. Since the duty of
the plaintiff and the consequences of a
breach thereof were explained to the jury
in appropriate language, there was no error
in not giving an instruction on secondary
assumption of risk in addition to a contributory negligence instruction. In short, we do
not think that instructions on both contributory negligence and assumption of risk in
this case were necessary. To the extent
that Rigtrup is inconsistent with this opinion, it is hereby overruled. It follows from
what has been stated that it was not error
to refuse to require the jury to make a
specific additional finding in the language
of assumption of risk beyond that required
in the contributory negligence interrogatory. Further support for the conclusion is
found in the fact that defendant's proposed
assumption of risk instructions, which were
not given, were erroneous and could not
have provided a foundation for the interrogatory. 5
Finally, there is no contention in this case
that there was an agreement whereby
plaintiff agreed to accept the danger here,
nor was the relationship between plaintiff
and defendant such that defendant had no
duty of care to the plaintiff.
5. Indeed, defendant's proposed Instruction
Nos. 11 and 12 on "assumption of risk" clearly
incorporated classical contributory negligence
language:
INSTRUCTION NO. 11
There is a legal principal [sic] commonly
referred to by the term "assumption of risk"
which is as follows:
One is said to assume a risk when he voluntarily manifests his assent to a dangerous
condition and voluntarily exposes himself to
that danger when he knows, or in the exercise of ordinary care would know, that a
danger exists in the condition of the equipment or premises and uses the equipment
and premises and voluntarily places himself
or remains, within the position of danger.

[7] Defendant's final claim on appeal is
that the jury should have been instructed
that, as a matter of law, plaintiff was negligent and that the negligence was the sole
cause of the injury, or alternatively that it
was a proximate cause of the injury. The
court correctly refused to give the instruction. Clearly there were factual issues both
as to negligence on the part of both parties
and as to the cause of the injury, and we
are obliged to sustain the jury's findings
because there was substantial evidence in
the record to support those findings. Maltby v. Cox Construction Co., Utah, 598 P.2d
336 (1979); Gordon v. Provo City, 15 Utah
2d 287, 391 P.2d 430 (1964).
The judgment is affirmed.
plaintiff.

Costs to

MAUGHAN, C. J., and WILKINS, J.,*
concur.
HALL, Justice (dissenting):
It appears from the evidence that one of
three things, or a combination thereof,
could have caused plaintiff's injuries: 1)
lack of a blade guard, 2) creeping of the
blade, or 3) plaintiffs inattention.
The record contains no direct evidence
that the lack of a blade guard or the creeping of the saw blade actually caused the
accident. Plaintiff's expert witness did testify, however, as to the obvious nature of
those two dangers. He opined that it was
"plain to see" that the saw was "unreasonaINSTRUCTION NO. 12
Before the doctrine of assumption of risk is
applicable, you must find: (1) the person in
question must have actual knowledge of the
danger, or the conditions must be such that
he would have such knowledge if he exercised ordinary care, (2) he must have freedom of choice. This freedom of choice must
have come from circumstances that provide
him a reasonable opportunity, without violating any legal or moral duty to safely refuse to
expose himself to the danger in question.
An interrogatory based on chose definitions of
assumption oi risk would have ozen improper.
* Wilkins, Justice, acted on this case prior to his
resignation.
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bly dangerous" since, it lacked a blade
guard, and since it "had a tendency to
move" forward from the rest position.
These dangers were certainly obvious to
him since he based his opinion, not upon his
operation or testing of the saw, but simply
upon his brief observation of it, from which
he theorized that the blade, turning up to
4,000 rpm, would cause "some movement of
the blade." Anyone with plaintiff's experience and familiarity with saws could, and
should have readily made the same observation before proceeding to use the saw.
Plaintiffs testimony as to causation was:
I took the two-by-four and I slid it in
front of the one-by-four [guide] towards
the nail [gauge] and against the one-byfour . . . .
As I glanced over now to
focus my attention on that nail and to
make sure this edge of the two-by-four
was up against the one-by-four, I felt the
saw grab my thumb and yank my hand
into the blade . . . .
In light of the foregoing explanation of
the event by plaintiff, it matters not whether the "tendency of the blade to move" was
an obvious danger, since it seems that it
could not have been a cause of the accident
anyway. This is to be seen in that had the
blade in fact crept forward, it would necessarily have come to rest when it came in
contact with the two-by-four plaintiff was
positioning to cut. Certainly, without manual assistance, the blade could not have cut
through the two-by-four which it would
have had to do to reach plaintiff's hand.
This assumes, of course, that plaintiff's
hand was properly positioned on the front
side of the two-by-four, away from the
blade.

by-four, away from the blade, but that by
inattention or otherwise, he reached over
the two-by-four to the back side thereof,
and into the blade.
When viewed in light of all of the facts
of this case, I deem the error in failing to
give an "obvious danger" instruction as not
merely harmless. The failure to give an
instruction to which a party is entitled may
constitute reversible error if it tends to: 1)
mislead the jury to the prejudice of the
complaining party; or 2) insufficiently or
erroneously advises the jury as to the law.1
In this case, the absence of an obvious danger instruction may well have prevented a
proper determination as to whether defendant was negligent in the first instance.
Therefore, I view the error as prejudicial.
What has heretofore been said applies
equally to the court's refusal to instruct the
jury on the doctrine of assumption of risk.
Notwithstanding the position taken by the
main opinion, I view the case of Rigtrup v.
Strawberry Water Users Association2 as
standing for the proposition that the doctrine of assumption of risk remains a viable
defense, it being consistent with the concepts of comparative fault as delineated in
the Comparative Negligence Act. 3 Moreover, Rule 8(c), U.R.C.P., specifically designates both assumption of risk and contributory negligence jas affirmative defenses.

Inasmuch as the jury found negligence on
the part of the plaintiff, it apparently concluded that plaintiff did not properly position his hand on the front side of the two-

Application of the doctrine of assumption
of risk requires knowledge by plaintiff of a
specific defect or dangerous condition.4 Assumption of the risk and contributory negligence are distinct legal doctrines. The former applies where one voluntarily exposes
himself to known danger, and the latter
applies where one negligently fails to discover the danger. 5 Situations may arise
where the two doctrines may overlap as
noted by Bean Prosser:

1. State v. Ouzounian, 2S Utah 2d 442, 491 P.2d
1093 (1971); see also, Rowley v. Graven Brothers & Co., 26 Utah 2d 443, 491 P.2d 1209
(1971).

4. Ferguson v. Jongsma, 10 Utah 2d 179, 350
P.2d 404 (I960);; Johnson v. Maynard, 9 Utah
2d 263. 342 ?.2d !334 (1059); see also. Foster v.
Steed, 23 Utah U 143, 453 ?.2d 1021 (1969).

2. Utah, 563 P.2d 1247 (1977).

5. Kuchenmeistzrv. Los Angeles and S.L.R. Co.,
52 Utah 116, 172 P. 725 (1918); see also, Clay
v. Dunford, 121 Utah 177, 239 P.2d 1075 (1952).

3. U.C.A.1953, 73-27-37.

MOORE v, BURTON LUM 5ER & HARDWARE CO.

Utah

873

Cite as, Utah, 31P.2d865

Obviously the two may co-exist when the
plaintiff makes an unreasonable choice to
incur the risk; but either may exist without the other. The significant difference,
when there is one, is likely to be one
between risks which were in fact known
to the plaintiff, and risks which he merely might have discovered by the exercise
of ordinary care. 6
In the past, the terms have often been
rather loosely applied. This was so because
each was a complete defense to a negligence action, that is, whether one knowingly or negligently "assumed the risk," the
result was the same—no recovery. When
the legislature passed our Comparative
Negligence Act, supra, it specifically recognized the doctrine of "assumption of the
risk" and included it within the term "contributory negligence." Since the enactment
thereof, this Court has held that assumption
of risk remains a viable defense in Utah.
In Rigtrup, supra, this Court approved the
giving of instructions both on contributory
negligence and assumption of risk. The
matter was stated therein as follows:
Though there have been some differences in view as to the defense of assumption of risk and its relation to other
aspects of contributory negligence, it has
since time immemorial been regarded as
a valid defense in the law of this State.
It has sometimes been said to be but a
specialized aspect of contributory negligence in that it can be intermingled and
fused with other aspects thereof in certain circumstances. It is also sometimes
said to be something separate from contributory negligence, as it undoubtedly
can be in some circumstances. However,
it requires but little reflection to see that
where there is a known danger, the risk
of which is voluntarily assumed by a party, such action may well fall within the
lack of due care which constitutes negligence and also may be correctly termed
6. Handbook of the Law of Torts, William Prosser (4th ed.). § 68, at p. 441.
7. Jacobsen Const. Co. v. Stmcto-Lite Engineering, Inc., Utah, 619 ?.2d 306 (1930). It is to be
noted that the holding in Jacobsen did not aboi632 P. 2d—20

an assumption of risk. [Citations omitted.] If such be the situation, the party
should be charged with the responsibility
for his conduct, by whatever term it may
be called; and the comparative negligence statute quoted above should be applied. . . .
That our conclusion just stated is the
correct one under our law is supported,
not only by the reasoning just stated and
the cases cited, but is made abundantly
clear by the fact that the legislature,
apparently in order to avoid any misunderstanding thereon, appended the last
sentence as quoted above that: as used in
this act, "contributory negligence" includes "assumption of the risk." That
sentence indicates a clear legislative intent to recognize the doctrine of "assumption of risk" as an aspect of contributory negligence in Utah law. Therefore
any attempt on m our part to judicially
abolish that defense would amount to a
direct repudiation of the legislative expression and thus a clear usurpation of
the legislative prerogative. 9
9 See Becker v. Beaverton School Dist, 25
Or.App. 879, 551 P.2d 498, where the court
refused to rule that a comparative negligence
statute had completely abolished the defense
of assumption of the risk.
Therefore, the negligence of a plaintiff
who knowingly and voluntarily encounters
a risk is to be compared with any of that of
a defendant pursuant to the provisions of
the Comparative Negligence Act, supra?
In the instant case, plaintiffs knowledge
and appreciation of the danger involved in
operating the saw was a question for the
jury, 8 and it was error for the court not to
give an appropriate instruction on such assumption of risk.
I would reverse and remand for the purpose of a new trial.
CROCKETT, J., concurs in the dissenting
opinion of HALL, J.
ish assumption of risk as a defense, but only
suggeste-J the abolition of "assumption of risk"
terminology.
8. Wold v. Csdsn City, 123 Utah 270, 258 P.2d
453 (1953).
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JACOBSEN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., a corporation; Jelco, Incorporated, a corporation; and Central Utah
Water Conservancy District, a body corporate and politic, Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v.
STRUCTO-UTE ENGINEERING, INC.,
a corporation, Defendant and
Appellant
No. 16208.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Oct. 1, 1980.
Contractors building water treatment
plant filed action against subcontractors
who constructed chemical storage tanks on
theories of negligence and breach of express warranty for faulty construction of
such storage tanks. The Third District
Court, Salt Lake, James S. Sawaya, J., entered judgment on a verdict which had been
directed against subcontractors and reduced
damages based on contributory negligence
and assumption of risk. Appeals were taken. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held
that: (1) under Utah's comparative negligence statute, "assumption of risk" language is not appropriate to describe the
various concepts previously dealt with under that terminology, but is to be treated,
in its secondary sense, as contributory negligence, and reasonableness of plaintiffs conduct in confronting a known or unknown
risk created by defendant's negligence will
basically be determined under principles of
contributory negligence, and (2) in a negligence action wherein assumption of risk is
raised, attention should be focused upon
whether a reasonably prudent man in the
exercise of due care would have incurred
the risk, despite his knowledge of it, and, if
so, whether he would have conducted himself in the manner in which plaintiff acted
in light of all surrounding circumstances,
including the appreciated risk, and then, if
plaintiffs unreasonableness is viewed to be
less than that of defendant, according to
the terms of comparative negligence statute, any damages allowed shall be diminish-

ed in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person recovering.
Judgment affirmed.
Hall, J., concurred in the result.
Crockett, C. J., concurred in the result
and filed opinion.
1. Contracts <s=>350(l)
Negligence <s=> 135(1)
In negligence and express warranty action by contractor building water treatment
plant against subcontractors who constructed chemical storage tanks, evidence supported verdict of contributory negligence,
and, furthermore, supported jury's finding
of assumption of risk. U.C.A.1953, 78-2737.
2. Negligence <s=>105
For purposes of action brought by contractors building water treatment plant
against subcontractors who constructed
chemical storage tanks, term "assumption
of risk" meant voluntary, yet unreasonable,
encounter with known, appreciated risk.
U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
3. Negligence s=>97
The complete bar to recovery which
"assumption of risk" once constituted in a
negligence action has been abolished by the
comparative negligence statute to avoid the
harshness visited upon plaintiffs as a result
of the all-or-nothing nature of the former
rule of law. U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37.
4. Negligence ®=>105
In its primary sense, assumption of risk
is alternative expression for proposition
that defendant was not negligent, that is,
there was no duty owed or there was no
breach of existing duties; in its secondary
sense, assumption of risk is affirmative defense to established breach of duty and as
such is phase of contributory negligence.
U.C.A.1953, 78-27-57.
5. Negligence <s=»97
Under Utah's comparative negligence
statute, "assumption of risk" language is
not appropriate to describe various concepts
previously dealt with under that terminology but is to be treated, in its secondary
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sense, as contributory negligence; specifically, reasonableness of plaintiffs' conduct
in confronting known or unknown risk created by defendant's negligence will basically be determined under principles of contributory negligence. U.C.A.1953, 78-2737.
6. Negligence <s=>98
For purposes of assumption of risk defense under comparative negligence statute,
attention should be focused on whether reasonably prudent man in exercise of due care
would have incurred risk, despite his knowledge of it, and, if so, whether he would
have conducted himself in manner in which
plaintiff acted in light of all surrounding
circumstances, including appreciated risk;
then, if plaintiffs unreasonableness is
viewed to be less than that of defendant,
according to terms of comparative negligence statute, any damages allowed shall be
diminished in proportion to amount of negligence attributable to person recovering.
U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37.
7. Contracts to 354
Negligence <*»142
In action brought by contractors building water treatment plant against subcontractors who constructed chemical storage
tanks on theories of negligence and breach
of express warranty wherein jury apportioned by percentage fault of each party
without differentiating between negligence
and breach of express warranty causes of
action, since same conduct of defendant
constituted both negligence and breach of
warranty and jury was instructed that
damages arising from breach of warranty
were same as for negligence, finding of
assumption of risk applied equally to both
negligence and warranty claims. U.C.A.
1953, 78-27-37.
Raymond M. Berry and H. James Clegg
of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, Harold
A. Hintze, Salt Lake City, for defendant
and appellant.
Arthur H. Nielsen and W. Waldan Lloyd
of Nielsen, Henriod, Gottfredson & Peck,
Edward W. Clyde of Clyde & Pratt, Salt
Lake City, for plaintiffs and respondents.

STEWART, Justice:
This appeal by defendant is from a judgment awarding plaintiffs damages resulting
from defendant's faulty construction of a
fiberglass storage tank. Defendant's claim
is that the jury's finding of assumption of
risk entirely precludes a judgment for
plaintiff under both of plaintiffs' theories
of recovery: negligence and breach of express warranty. The central issues raised
are (1) whether assumption of risk is a
complete bar to plaintiffs' recovery under
Utah's comparative negligence statute,
Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, § 7827-37, and (2) whether assumption of risk
constitutes a defense to an action for
breach of express warranty.
Plaintiffs Jacobsen Construction Company and Jelco, Inc. ("Jacobsen-Jelco"), acting as joint venturers, contracted with
plaintiff Central Utah Water Conservancy
District ("Conservancy District") to build a
water treatment plant. Jacobsen-Jelco entered into a subcontract with defendant
Structo-Lite Engineering, Inc. ("StructoLite") whereby Structo-Lite would provide
six fiberglass chemical storage tanks constructed in accordance with the plans and
specifications of the project engineers,
third-party defendant Templeton, Linke
and Associates.
Mr. Bevan, president of Structo-Lite,
represented to Jacobsen's agent that Structo-Lite would fabricate fiberglass tanks
which would meet the plans and specifications of the project engineers. Mr. Bevan
personally signed the purchase order which
provided that Structo-Lite would supply
the tanks in conformity with all engineering plans and specifications and that they
would be warranted by Structo-Lite as to
quality of workmanship and materials.
After defendant delivered the tanks to
the job site, the project superintendent for
Jacobsen-Jelco observed that some of the
temporary supports used to maintain roundness had failed in transit, causing the tanks
to appear elliptical at the open end and
resulting in damage to the flanges located
at the tops of the tanks. Mr. Bevan, upon
being informed of these findings, indicated
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that he would make the necessary repairs
and install the remaining connections.
Prior to completion of the job, all six
tanks were filled with water to test for
leaks. Four of the six tanks were found to
have minor leaks. The tank which subsequently failed was not one of the four.
Structo-Lite, upon being informed of the
leaks, made the necessary repairs.
Upon completion of the project and prior
to operation, a seven-day test of the facilities was conducted. The plant, upon passing the test, was declared ready for operation.
Liquid alum was poured into one of the
tanks in May of 1974. The following July a
tank which subsequently exploded was
filled with alum. The day after the chemical was placed in the tank, the plant operator noticed a minute leak. Before he could
lessen the pressure, the tank exploded,
spreading the liquid chemical throughout
the entire building. Substantial damage to
the heating and electrical system in the
plant resulted.
Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging negligence in the construction of the tanks and
breach of contract and express warranty
for failure to construct the tanks according
to the specifications agreed upon. StructoLite filed a third-party complaint against
Templeton, Linke and Associates for inadequate design and specifications.
After all testimony was submitted, the
trial court directed a verdict against Structo-Lite on the ground that the evidence
showed as a matter of law that the tanks
had been negligently manufactured. Defendant then requested that special interrogatories be submitted to the jury. In
answer to the interrogatories, the jury
found Jacobsen-Jelco and Conservancy District had been contributorily negligent and
had assumed the risk of the incurred damages. In apportioning the proximate contribution of each party toward the loss, the
jury found Structo-Lite 70% liable and Jacobsen-Jelco and Conservancy District 20%
and 10% responsible, respectively. The jury
found Templeton, Linke and Associates,
third-party defendants, not negligent.

[1] Plaintiffs cross-appeal, contending
that they were entitled to a finding, as a
matter of law, that they were not contributorily negligent and that they had not assumed the risk of defendant's negligence.
The evidence shows that Jacobsen-Jelco
was aware that the tanks were "out-ofround," a visual inspection evidencing a
three to four inch differential in tank diameter from the high to the low spot on the
tank. Jacobsen-Jelco was also aware of an
elliptical shape and damaged flanges located at the top end of the tanks resulting
from failure of the bracing supports during
transit to the water plant. Conservancy
District noticed during construction of the
tanks that they did not all have smooth
surfaces and detected spots where the woven roving was not covered by the fiberglass matting. Further, after installation
at the plant site, flat spots and irregularities on the tanks were noticed.
After the water testing revealed leaks in
several of the tanks, plaintiffs, knowing
that alum solution was heavier than water,
proceeded to fill the tanks with alum solution without any further testing for tensile
strength. Moreover, testing by the American Testing Laboratories at the direction of
Jacobsen-Jelco revealed some deficiencies
in the fabrication of the tanks. Plaintiffs'
knowledge of these defects must be viewed
in light of the warranty given by defendants that the tanks would conform to the
specifications of the general contract, including a tensile strength of 100,000 psi and
a flexal strength of 150,000 psi with a "very
smooth, hard surface and good finishing
properties."
We review the facts and the inferences to
be drawn therefrom in favor of the verdict
and conclude that the verdict as to contributory negligence is supported by the evidence. Furthermore, there is a reasonable
basis in the evidence to find that plaintiffs
unreasonably proceeded in light of their
knowledge and appreciation of the risk created by defendant, and we thus uphold the
jury's finding of plaintiffs' assumption of
risk.
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[2,3] We next address the contention
raised by defendant that plaintiffs' assumption of risk should completely bar recovery.
The term "assumption of risk" has been
historically defined and applied in different
ways. Under the circumstances in this
case, the term "assumption of risk" meant
the voluntary, yet unreasonable, encounter
of a known, appreciated risk. The complete
bar to recovery which such conduct once
constituted in a negligence action has been
abolished by the Utah comparative negligence statute to avoid the harshness visited
upon plaintiffs as a result of the all-ornothing nature of the former rule of law.
Section 78-27-37 provides:
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or his
legal representative to recover damages
for negligence or gross negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or
property, if such negligence was not as
great as the negligence or gross negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed
shall be diminished in the proportion to
the amount of negligence attributable to
the person recovering. As used in this
act, "contributory negligence" includes
"assumption of the risk."
The legislative intent to include assumption of risk within contributory negligence
terminology and eliminate the use of the
term is consistent with a recent trend established by other courts, legislatures, and
legal commentators alike.
The 1973 Oregon Legislature passed the
Oregon Comparative Negligence Statute
which is basically identical to Utah's comparative negligence statute. Two years later, in an apparent attempt to clarify its
intent, the Legislature amended the Act.
ORS 18.470 Oregon Laws, 1975, Chapter
599, § 4(2) now reads: "The doctrine of
implied assumption of the risk is abolished."
Connecticut has likewise abolished the term
1. Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion
in Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318 U.S.
54, 68, 63 S.Ct. 444, 451, 87 L.Ed. 610 (1943),
commented upon this confusion:
The phrase "assumption of risk" is an excellent illustration of the extent to which un-

by statute. G.S.C.A. § 52-572h (1973). See
also North Dakota Statute N.D.C.C. § 910-06 (1973); Wentz v. Deseth, N.D., 221
N.W.2d 101 (1974).
The term "assumption of risk" has caused
considerable confusion in its indiscriminate
use.1 Its overuse in the number and variety
of definitions of the term have brought
disfavor to the defense, and the trend has
been to eliminate its use in favor of negligence language. See Keeton, Assumption
of Risk in Products Liability Cases, 22 La.L.
Rev. 122, 123-30 (1961); Prosser, Law of
Torts § 68 (4th ed. 1971); 2 Harper and
James, The Law of Torts § 21.1 (1956).
Feigner v. Anderson, 375 Mich. 23, 133
N.W.2d 136, 148-49 n.4 (1965), quoted Professor James:
"The doctrine of assumption of risk,
however it is analyzed and defined, is in
most of its aspects a defendant's doctrine
which restricts liability and so cuts down
the compensation of accident victims. It
is a heritage of the extreme individualism
of the early industrial revolution. But
quite aside from any questions of policy
or of substance, the concept of assuming
the risk is purely duplicative of other
more widely understood concepts, such as
scope of duty or contributory negligence.
The one exception is to be found, perhaps,
in those cases where there is an actual
agreement. Moreover, the expression has
come to stand for two or three distinct
notions which are not at all the same,
though they often overlap in the sense
that they are applicable to the same situation.
"Except for express assumption of risk,
therefore, the term and the concept
should be abolished. It adds nothing to
modern law except confusion. For the
most part the policy of individualism it
represents is outmoded in accident laws;
where it is not, that policy can find full
critical use of words bedevils the law. A
phrase begins life as a literary expression; its
felicity leads to its lazy repetition; and repetition soon establishes it as a legal formula,
undiscriminatingly used to express different
and sometimes contradictory ideas.
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scope and far better expression in other is a phase of contributory negligence. As
language. There is only one thing that stated in Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attraccan be said for assumption of risk. In tions, Inc., supra:
We here speak solely of the area in
the confusion it introduces, it sometimeswhich injury or damage was neither inironically and quite capriciously-leads to
tended nor expressly contracted to be
a relaxation of an overstrict rule in some
nonactionable. In this area, assumption
other field. The aura of disfavor that
of risk has two distinct meanings. In one
has come to surround it may occasionally
sense (sometimes called its "primary"
turn out to be the kiss of death to some
sense), it is an alternate expression for
other bad rule with which it has become
the proposition that defendant was not
associated. We have seen how this may
negligent, j. e., either owed no duty or did
happen with the burden of pleading and
not breach the duty owed. In its other
proving an exceptional limitation on the
sense (sometimes called "secondary"), asscope of defendant's duty. There may be
sumption of risk is an affirmative defense
other instances. But at best this sort of
to an established breach of duty. In its
thing is a poor excuse indeed for continuprimary sense, it is accurate to say plaining the confusion of an unfortunate form
tiff assumed the risk whether or not he
of words."
was "at fault", for the truth thereby ex[James, Assumption of Risk, 61 Yale L.J.
pressed
in alternate terminology is that
141, 168-69 (1952).]
defendant was not negligent. But in its
For purposes of analysis, assumption of
secondary sense, i. e., as an affirmative
risk is often divided into three categories.
defense to an established breach of deThose courts which attempt to deal with the
fendant's duty, it is incorrect to say plainvarious concepts subsumed under the one
tiff assumed the risk whether or not he
label refrain from considering one form,
was at fault.
that is, the "express" form of assumption of
*
*
*
*
*
*
risk. See Blackburn v. Dorta, Fla., 348
Hence we think it clear that assumpSo.2d 287, 289 (1977); Meistrich v. Casino
tion of risk in its secondary sense is a
Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44; 155 A.2d
mere phase of contributory negligence,
90 (1959). An express assumption of risk
the total issue being whether a reasoninvolves a contractual provision in which a
ably prudent man in the exercise of due
party expressly contracts not to sue for
care (a) would have incurred the known
injury or loss which may thereafter be occarisk and (b) if he would, whether such a
sioned by the acts of another. We not only
person in the light of all of the circumfollow suit by refraining to include this
stances including the appreciated risk
form of assumption of risk in our discuswould have conducted himself in the
sion, but furthermore fail to see a necessity
manner in which plaintiff acted.
for including this form within assumption
Thus in the area under discussion there
of risk terminology. As stated in James,
are but two basic issues: (1) defendant's
Assumption of Risk, 61 Yale L.J. 141 (1952),
negligence, and (2) plaintiffs contributothe field of contract law is more than adery negligence. In view of the consideraquate to deal with this bar to recovery.
tions discussed above, it has been urged
[4] We are thus left with the primary
that assumption of risk in both its priand secondary forms of assumption of risk.
mary and secondary senses serves merely
to confuse and should be eliminated. EdIn its primary sense, it is an alternative
itorial, Assumption of the Risk-A False
expression for the proposition that defendIssue, 73 NJ.L.J. 346 (1950); James, Asant was not negligent, that is, there was no
sumption of Risk, 61 Yale LJ. 141, 169
duty owed or there was no breach of an
(1952); 2 Harper and James, Law of
existing duty. In its secondary sense, asTorts (1956), § 221.8, p. 1191.
sumption of risk is an affirmative defense
*
*
*
*
*
*
to an established breach of duty and as such
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Perhaps a well-guarded charge of assumption of risk in its primary sense will
aid comprehension. But we cannot see
how a charge of the concept in its secondary sense will contribute a net gain. [155
A.2d at 93, 94-95.]
The New Jersey court disposed of the last
vestiges of assumption of risk four years
later in McGrath v. American Cyanamid
Co., 41 N.J. 272, 196 A.2d 238, 239-41
(1963):
In Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90, 82
A.L.R.2d 1208 (1959), we pointed out that
assumption of the risk was theretofore
used in two incongruous senses: in one
sense it meant the defendant was not
negligent, while in its other sense it
meant the plaintiff was contributorily
negligent. We said that in truth there
are but two issues-negligence and contributory negligence-both to be resolved
by the standard of the reasonably prudent man, and that it was erroneous to
suggest to the jury that assumption of
the risk was still another issue.
It was our hope that after Meistrich
the bench and bar would focus upon the
true issues, but unhappily some cling to
the terminology of assumption of risk and
continue to be misled by it even while
purporting to think of it as merely a
covertible equivalent of negligence or
contributory negligence.
*
*
*
*
«
*

The New Jersey decisions quoted above
have been cited approvingly by several jurisdictions adopting the same approach.
Leavitt v. Gillaspie, Alaska, 443 P.2d 61
(1968); Fawcett v. Irby, 92 Idaho 48, 436
P.2d 714 (1968) (Spear, J., concurring specially); Feigner v. Anderson, 375 Mich. 23,
133 N.W.2d 136 (1965); Williamson v.
Smith, 83 N.M. 336, 491 P.2d 1147 (1972).
Other courts have likewise abolished the use
of assumption of risk terminology, accepting the argument that assumption of risk
serves no purpose which is not served either
by the doctrine of contributory negligence
or the common law concept of duty. Boldue v. Crain, 104 N.H. 163, 181 A.2d 641
(1962); McConville v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Ins. Co., 15 Wis.2d 374, 113
N.W.2d 14 (1962). See also Petrone v. Margolis, 20 NJ.Super. 180, 89 A.2d 476 (1952).
The policy set forth in our comparative
negligence act parallels this trend. This
Court was faced with construing the assumption of risk doctrine in light of our
comparative negligence act in Rigtrup v.
Strawberry Water Users Association, Utah,
563 P.2d 1247 (1977). The Court recognized
the various forms of conduct subsumed under assumption of risk terminology but indicated that retention of the term comported
with the statute and that the term, properly
construed, was not inconsistent with the
comparative fault concept.

What is important is the concept embodied in the comparative negligence statute,
In Meistrich we said the terminology of and the particular labels assigned to the
assumption of the risk should not be used type of fault involved should not interfere
when it is projected in its secondary therewith. The Court in Rigtrup alluded to
sense, i. e., that of contributory negli- this form of analysis by focusing on the
gence (31 N.J., at p. 55, 155 A.2d at p. 96, underlying conduct rather than the tradi82 A.L.R.2d 1208). We thought, however, tional terminology in the following stateI
that '[pjerhaps a well-guarded charge of ment:
[Assumption of risk] has sometimes been
assumption of risk in its primary sense
said to be but a specialized aspect of
will aid comprehension' (31 N.J. p. 54,155
contributory negligence in that it can be
A.2d p. 96, 82 A.L.R.2d 1208). * * * Experience, however, indicates the term 'asintermingled and fused with other assumption ofrisk*is so apt to create mist
pects thereof in certain circumstances. It
that it is better banished from the scene.
is also sometimes said to be something
We hope we have heard the last of it.
separate from contributory negligence, as
Henceforth let us stay with "negligence"
it undoubtedly can be in some circumand "contributory negligence."
stances. However, it requires but little
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reflection to see that where there is a
known danger, the risk of which is voluntarily assumed by a party, such action
may well fail within the lack of due care
which constitutes negligence and also
may be correctly termed an assumption
of risk. If such be the situation, the
party should be charged with the responsibility for his conduct, by whatever term
it may be called; and the comparative
negligence statute quoted above should
be applied as the trial court correctly did
in this case. [Footnotes omitted; emphasis added.] [563 P.2d at 1250.]
[5,6] We thus hold that under our comparative negligence statute "assumption of
risk" language is not appropriate to describe the various concepts previously dealt
with under that terminology but is to be
treated, in its secondary sense, as contributory negligence. Specifically, and with particular reference to our comparative negligence act, the reasonableness of plaintiffs
conduct in confronting a known or unknown risk created by defendant's negligence will basically be determined under
principles of contributory negligence.2 Attention should be focused on whether a
reasonably prudent man in the exercise of
due care would have incurred the risk, despite his knowledge of it, and if so, whether
he would have conducted himself in the
manner in which the plaintiff acted in light
of all the surrounding circumstances, including the appreciated risk. See Leavitt v.
Gillaspie, supra. Then, if plaintiff's unreasonableness is viewed to be less than that of
defendant, according to the terms of the
statute, "any damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of
negligence attributable to the person recovering."
[7] Defendants next contend that assumption of risk should stand as a bar to
recovery for breach of express warranty.
2. When there is a knowing and express oral or
written consent to the dangerous activity or
condition, a contractual theory will suffice to
bar recovery.
3. We also note that this Court in Ernest W.
Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., Utah, 601 P.2d
152 (1979), stated in dictum that one who un-

In Vernon v. Lake Motors, 26 Utah 2d 269,
488 P.2d 302 (1971), this Court held that a
plaintiff who deliberately and unreasonably
uses a product which he knows to be defective is precluded from recovering damages
in an action for breach of express warranty.3
Nevertheless, it has been argued that the
principles of comparative fault should be
extended to breach of warranty cases. Pursuant to that theory damages would be reduced to the extent of plaintiff's contribution to the fault. But no such proposal is
before the Court, and we refrain from reappraising the status of the law as to assumption of risk as a defense to breach of express warranty.
In this case the jury apportioned by percentage the fault of each party without
differentiating between the negligence and
breach of express warranty causes of action. Since the same conduct of defendant
constituted both negligence and breach of
warranty, and since the jury was instructed
that the damages resulting from the breach
of warranty were the same as for negligence, the finding of assumption of risk
applies equally to both the negligence and
warranty claims.
As to the remaining issues, we hold that
the trial court acted within the confines of
sound discretion on all counts.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed. Costs to Respondents.
MAUGHAN and WILKINS, JJ., concur.
HALL, J., concurs in result.
CROCKETT, Chief Justice (concurring in
result).
I must confess my inability to see either
necessity or desirability in the main opinion's treatment of what impresses me as an
reasonably proceeds to make use of a product
which he knows to be dangerous cannot recover under a strict products liability theory or
breach of implied warranty theory. The Court
did not address the issue of whether comparative fault had any applicability in such a case.
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effort to discredit the doctrine of assumption of risk in order to decide this case. It
is my view that the trial court gave a
correct and appropriate instruction as applied to the evidence. That is sufficient to
dispose of the issue.
Though it may be true that assumption of
risk is but a specialized aspect of contributory negligence, it has its uses in more
closely focusing attention upon certain fact
situations.1 The broad principle which underlies contributory negligence is that the
plaintiff fails to use reasonable care for his
own safety. A particular aspect thereof is
where he knows of a danger, and has a
reasonable opportunity to make an alternative choice, but nevertheless voluntarily
proceeds and assumes the risk of harm.2
This Court has but recently dealt with
this problem in Rigtrup v. Strawberry
Water Users Ass'n* wherein we stated:
Plaintiffs urge that inasmuch as the
trial court had adequately instructed on
contributory negligence, it was error to
also instruct on assumption of risk. They
argue that this defense is spurious and
should be abolished, citing cases from
states where they assert that has been
done by judicial declaration.* We do not
so read those cases. They deal for the
most part with whether there are meaningful distinctions between contributory
negligence and assumption of risk. Howsoever that might be, we decline the invitation to so change our law. One of the
important values in our system which
tends to produce confidence in and respect for the law is that the law as it is
declared and known has sufficient solidarity and continuity that it can be relied
on with assurance. We think that those
objectives are best served by the judicial
branch refraining from legislating any
abrupt or dramatic changes of a substantial nature in the law and by leaving any
such changes therein to the legislature,
whose constitutional prerogative it is.*
1.

See discussion by Justice Henriod, speaking
for the Court, in Clay v. Dun ford, et ai, 121
Utah 177, 239 P.2d 1075 (1952).

2.

See Jacques v. Farrimond, 14 Utah 2d 166,
380 P.2d 133 (1963), citing Prosser on Torts, p.

Though there have been some differences in view as to the defense of assumption of risk and its relation to other
aspects of contributory negligence, it has
since time immemorial been regarded as
a valid defense in th<e law of this State.
That our conclusion just stated is the
correct one under our law is supported,
not only by the reasoning just stated and
the cases cited, but is made abundantly
clear by the fact that the legislature,
apparently in order to avoid any misunderstanding thereon, appended the last
sentence as quoted above that: as used in
this act, "contributory negligence" includes "assumption o\f the risk/' That
sentence indicates a clear legislative intent to recognize the doctrine of "assumption of risk" as a^n aspect of contributory negligence in Utah law. Therefore
any attempt on our part to judicially
abolish that defense would amount to a
direct repudiation of the legislative expression and thus a clear usurpation of
the legislative prerogative. * * * See citations in original. [Emphasis added.]
In accordance with what has been said
above, I do not join in the main opinion's
treatment of what I regard as the timehonored and, in some instances, useful doctrine of assumption of risk; first, because I
do not think that treatment is necessary to
the correct and satisfactory disposition of
this case; and second, because I think the
previous decisions of this Court are sound
and useful applications of the law to the
particular fact situations and that others
will likely continue to occur in the future.
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